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NOTES 
THE SCOPE OF PROTECTED ACTIVITY UNDER 
SECTION 806 OF SOX 
Timothy J. Fitzmaurice*
 
 
Section 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) created a new 
federal anti-retaliation protection for corporate whistleblowers.  Initially, 
the Department of Labor Administrative Review Board (ARB) and federal 
courts limited the scope of section 806 by holding that a whistleblower must 
report conduct that “definitively and specifically” relates to a violation of 
one of the rules, regulations, or laws listed in section 806 to engage in 
protected activity.  Recently, however, the ARB abandoned this approach, 
and held that a whistleblower engages in protected activity under section 
806 when she reports information that she “reasonably believes” relates to 
a violation of one of the rules, regulations, or laws listed in section 806.   
The ARB’s decision to adopt the “reasonably believes” standard should 
be entitled to Chevron deference.  However, empirical studies indicate that 
in cases where Chevron should apply, courts engage in ad hoc statutory 
interpretation nearly as often as they defer to the agency decision.   
This Note argues that in the foreseeable event that a court neglects 
Chevron and engages in ad hoc statutory interpretation the reasonably 
believes standard should govern the scope of protected activity under 
section 806 for several reasons.  First, the definitively and specifically 
standard conflicts with the text of section 806.  Second, the legislative 
history of section 806 supports the reasonably believes standard.  Third, the 
reasonably believes standard is more consistent with the reasonable person 
standard that Congress intended.  Finally, the reasonably believes standard 
serves two important public policy goals:  harmonizing the protected 
activity standards under SOX and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act and helping to remedy the lack of success 
whistleblowers have had using section 806’s anti-retaliation protections. 
 
 
 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2013, Fordham University School of Law; B.A. 2010, Boston College.  I 
would like to thank Professor Joseph Landau for his invaluable encouragement and advice 
throughout the process of writing this Note.  Finally, the most thanks go to my wife, Victoria 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2001 and 2002, a series of corporate accounting scandals rocked 
American investors, and left them asking whether any company could be 
trusted.1  Some of America’s largest corporations, including Enron, Xerox, 
and WorldCom, reported that they had overstated their prior earnings by 
tens or hundreds of millions of dollars through the use of improper 
accounting practices.2  For Enron and WorldCom, the end result was the 
filing of what were, at the time, the two largest bankruptcies in American 
history.3  Subsequent investigations revealed that some companies had 
retaliated against employees who attempted to blow the whistle on these 
improper accounting practices.4
To restore investors’ confidence in corporate financial disclosures,
 
5 and 
to address systemic weaknesses revealed by these scandals,6 Congress 
swiftly enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 20027 (SOX).  SOX established 
new accounting and financial reporting requirements,8 and imposed harsh 
civil and criminal penalties for violations.9
 
 1. See Alexandra Twin, One Wild Ride, CNNMONEY.COM (July 23, 2002, 10:52 AM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2002/07/22/markets/markets_newyork/index.htm (“WorldCom’s 
accounting problems have contributed to the plummeting of investor confidence that has 
shaken markets since the Enron scandal last fall.”). 
  Additionally, in response to the 
 2. See Penelope Patsuris, The Corporate Scandal Sheet, FORBES (Aug. 26, 2002, 5:30 
PM), http://www.forbes.com/2002/07/25/accountingtracker.html. 
 3. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION 
OF ENRON CORPORATION AND RELATED ENTITIES REGARDING FEDERAL TAX AND 
COMPENSATION ISSUES, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, VOLUME I:  REPORT 58 (Comm. 
Print 2003) [hereinafter JCT REPORT], available at http://www.jct.gov/s-3-03-vol1.pdf.  
Currently, the Enron and WorldCom bankruptcies are the sixth and third largest in American 
history, respectively. See Shira Ovide, MF Global:  Likely Among the 10 Biggest 
Bankruptcies Ever, WALL ST. J. DEAL J. (Oct. 31, 2011, 10:38 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
deals/2011/10/31/mf-global-likely-among-the-10-biggest-bankruptcies-ever/?mod=e2tw. 
 4. See Jodie Morse & Amanda Bower, The Party Crasher, TIME, Dec. 30, 2002–Jan. 6, 
2003, at 53; Susan Pulliam & Deborah Solomon, Uncooking the Books:  How Three Unlikely 
Sleuths Discovered Fraud at WorldCom, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2002, at A1. 
 5. S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 2 (2002) (SOX was designed “to address the systemic and 
structural weaknesses affecting . . . capital markets which were revealed by repeated failures 
of audit effectiveness and corporate financial and broker-dealer responsibility”).  Because 
“the [SOX] conference committee did not produce a report,” “the legislative history analysis 
of [SOX] depends largely on the report of the Senate Banking Committee [Senate Report 
205].” 1 JOHN T. BOSTELMAN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DESKBOOK 2-37 (2008). 
 6. 1 BOSTELMAN, supra note 5, at 2-38 (SOX was designed to “restore investor 
confidence by improving corporate financial reporting”). 
 7. See John Paul Lucci, Enron—The Bankruptcy Heard Around the World and the 
International Ricochet of Sarbanes-Oxley, 67 ALB. L. REV. 211, 215 (2003) (“Remarkably, 
the Act became law a mere seven months after Enron filed for bankruptcy.”). 
 8. See generally Neil H. Aronson, Preventing Future Enrons:  Implementing the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 127, 132–46 (2002).  A full summary 
of SOX is outside the scope of this Note, but for such a summary, see generally William S. 
Duffey, Jr., Corporate Fraud and Accountability:  A Primer on Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
54 S.C. L. REV. 405 (2002); Brian Kim, Recent Developments, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 40 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 235 (2003). 
 9. See Andrew B. Cripe, Employee and Director Accountability to Shareholders:  
Doing Business for Business Owners, 1 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 153, 174 (2003) 
(“[C]ompanies and top executives should bear in mind . . . [that there are] harsh civil and 
criminal consequences under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act . . . .”); see also, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 
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discovery that some companies retaliated against employees who tried to 
blow the whistle on the accounting scandals that were uncovered during 
2001 and 2002,10 SOX prohibited corporations from retaliating against 
whistleblowers11 in section 806 of the Act.12
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under section 806 of SOX, a 
whistleblower must show that (1) she engaged in protected activity, (2) her 
employer knew about her protected activity, (3) she suffered an unfavorable 
personnel action, and (4) the “circumstances were sufficient to raise the 
inference that the protected activity was a contributing factor in the 
unfavorable action.”
 
13  Initially, the Department of Labor Administrative 
Review Board (ARB) and several federal courts limited section 806’s scope 
and held that to engage in protected activity a whistleblower must report 
conduct that “definitively and specifically” relates to a violation of one of 
the rules, regulations, or laws listed in section 806.14  More recently, 
however, the ARB abandoned this standard,15 holding that a whistleblower 
engages in protected activity when she reports information that she 
“reasonably believes” relates to a violation of one of the rules, regulations, 
or laws listed in section 806.16
The ARB’s decision to adopt the reasonably believes standard should be 
entitled to Chevron deference.
 
17  Empirical studies show, however, that the 
U.S. Supreme Court18
 
§ 1513(e) (2006) (“Whoever knowingly, with the intent to retaliate, takes any action harmful 
to any person, including interference with the lawful employment or livelihood of any 
person, for providing to a law enforcement officer any truthful information relating to the 
commission or possible commission of any Federal offense, shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.”). 
 does not treat Chevron as a decision that is entitled to 
 10. See supra note 4. 
 11. See 148 CONG. REC. 14,447 (2002) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (“[W]e include 
meaningful protections for corporate whistleblowers . . . .  We learned from Sherron Watkins 
of Enron that these corporate insiders are the key witnesses that need to be encouraged to 
report fraud and help prove it in court.”). 
 12. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 806(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2006). 
 13. 29 C.F.R. § 1980.104(b)(1) (2011). 
 14. See Platone v. FLYi, Inc., ARB No. 04-154, slip op. at 17 (Sept. 29, 2006), aff’d 548 
F.3d 322 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding that to engage in protected activity under section 806, a 
whistleblower must provide information that “definitively and specifically” relates to a 
violation of one of the laws, rules, or regulations listed in section 806); see also Vodopia v. 
Koninklijke Philips Elecs., N.V., 398 F. App’x 659, 662–63 (2d Cir. 2010); Van Asdale v. 
Int’l Game Tech., 577 F.3d 989, 996–97 (9th Cir. 2009); Day v. Staples, Inc., 555 F.3d 42, 
55 (1st Cir. 2009); Welch v. Chao, 536 F.3d 269, 275 (4th Cir. 2008); Allen v. Admin. 
Review Bd., 514 F.3d 468, 476–77 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 15. Sylvester v. Parexel Int’l LLC, ARB No. 07-123, slip op. at 18 (May 25, 2011) 
(holding that the “definitively and specifically” standard “has evolved into an inappropriate 
test”). 
 16. Id. at 19 (holding that the “critical focus” when determining whether an employee 
engaged in protected activity under section 806 is “whether the employee reported conduct 
that he or she reasonably believes constituted a violation of” section 806, “not whether that 
information ‘definitively and specifically’ described” such a violation). 
 17. See infra Part I.D.1. 
 18. These studies are instructive because 
the Supreme Court is where any analysis of agency deference ought to begin.  The 
Court, of course, develops deference tests that are applicable throughout the 
federal judiciary.  Therefore, we can assume that, of all courts, its practice would 
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stare decisis effect.19  Instead, it treats Chevron as a canon of statutory 
interpretation,20 and—in cases where Chevron should apply— defers to an 
agency’s interpretation of a statute only slightly more often than it engages 
in ad hoc statutory interpretation.21
Part I of this Note discusses the accounting scandals of 2001 and 2002, 
section 806 of SOX, how the Supreme Court uses the text and legislative 
history of a statute to interpret its meaning, and Chevron.  Then, Part II 
analyzes the ARB’s evolving interpretation of the scope of protected 
activity under section 806.  Finally, in Part III, this Note argues that if a 
court neglects Chevron and engages in ad hoc statutory interpretation, the 
reasonably believes standard is the proper interpretation of the scope of 
protected activity under section 806. 
  Accordingly, although courts should be 
able to defer to the “reasonably believes” standard under Chevron, this Note 
argues that in the foreseeable event that a court neglects Chevron and 
engages in ad hoc statutory interpretation, it should nevertheless adhere to 
the reasonably believes standard. 
I.  UNDERSTANDING SECTION 806 OF SOX 
Part I begins by discussing the important role that whistleblowers play in 
detecting corporate fraud.  Then, it discusses the corporate accounting 
scandals of 2001 and 2002, with a particular focus on the Enron scandal and 
Sherron Watkins, an Enron employee who tried to blow the whistle on 
Enron’s improper accounting practices, but was silenced.  Next, this part 
analyzes section 806’s text and legislative history, how the Supreme Court 
uses the text and legislative history of a statute to interpret its meaning, and 
two important public policy concerns:  whistleblowers’ lack of success 
using section 806’s anti-retaliation protections, and the similarities and 
 
be particularly well-informed and . . . .  [that] the appeals courts look to the 
Supreme Court for guidance.  The Supreme Court devises deference tests, defines 
their parameters, and provides definitive applications of those tests—all of which 
are binding on the courts of appeals.  Lower court judges presumptively follow the 
Court’s lead, to the extent that a “lead” can be discerned. 
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:  Supreme Court 
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 
1097 (2008). 
 19. See id. at 1128 tbl.6; Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a 
Canon, Not a Precedent:  An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency 
Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1727, 1797 (2010) (observing that Supreme Court 
“Justices rarely treat Chevron as a precedent entitled to strict stare decisis effect”). 
 20. See Raso & Eskridge, supra note 19, at 1765 (“Deference regimes . . . are more like 
canons of statutory construction than binding precedents.”); id. at 1766 (“Like the canons, 
and unlike binding precedents, Chevron and the other formal deference regimes have the 
following characteristics in practice:  They are flexible rules of thumb or presumptions 
deployed by the Justices episodically and not entirely predictably, rather than binding rules 
that the Justices apply more systematically.”); id. at 1799 (“[T]he actual fate of an agency’s 
interpretation depends on a cluster of variables—or canons—only one of which is the 
deference regime.”). 
 21. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 18, at 1128 tbl.6 (showing that of the 267 cases 
where Chevron should have applied because Congress delegated lawmaking authority to the 
administrative agency interpreting the statute, the Court applied no deference regime in 66 
decisions and invoked Chevron in 75 decisions). 
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differences between the whistleblower protections that SOX and the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act provide.  This part 
concludes by discussing the Supreme Court’s decisions regarding when 
federal courts should defer to an administrative agency’s interpretation of a 
statute, and empirical studies tracking the Supreme Court’s adherence to 
these decisions.  
A.  The Importance of Corporate Whistleblowers 
The term “whistleblower” originates from a practice of English 
constables, who would blow their whistles to inform other officers that help 
was needed.22  Today, this concept refers to “[a]n employee who reports 
employer wrongdoing.”23  Such employees are indispensible to detecting 
and preventing corporate fraud.24  A 2007 poll found that 62 percent of 
corporate chief financial officers believed that the company’s external 
auditors would not notice if they intentionally altered their company’s 
financial statements.25  Additionally, a recent study found that 
whistleblowers uncover 17 percent of corporate fraud cases in America—
more than double the percentage that the SEC uncovers.26
B.  The 2001–02 Corporate Accounting Scandals 
  These statistics 
confirm that external monitoring is likely insufficient to detect corporate 
fraud, and that whistleblowers are indispensible to investigators.  This was 
perhaps never more true than during the accounting scandals of 2001 and 
2002. 
This section briefly discusses the accounting scandals of 2001–02 as well 
as the market conditions that contributed to them.  Then, this section details 
the Enron accounting scandal.  It concludes by discussing the experience of 
Sherron Watkins, an Enron employee who tried, but failed, to blow the 
whistle on the company’s improper accounting practices. 
Fast-growing companies, like dot-com tech firms, dominated the bull 
markets of the 1990s, and, as a result, the potential for growth became more 
important to investors than a company’s current financial condition.27
 
 22. Lucienne M. Hartmann, Comment, Whistle While You Work:  The Fairytale-Like 
Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act and the Emergence of ‘Greedy,’ the Eighth 
Dwarf, 62 MERCER L. REV. 1279, 1280 (2011). 
  To 
maintain favor with investors, traditional companies were under 
 23. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1734 (9th ed. 2009). 
 24. See S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 10 (2002) (noting that corporate whistleblowers “are the 
only people who can testify as to ‘who knew what, and when,’ crucial questions . . . in all 
complex securities fraud investigations”). 
 25. Nearly Two-Thirds of CFOs Feel They Could Intentionally Misstate Financial 
Statements; Only Half Aware of XBRL, BUS. WIRE (Nov. 7, 2007, 8:00 AM), 
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20071107005031/en/Two-Thirds-CFOs-Feel-
Intentionally-Misstate-Financial-Statements. 
 26. Alexander Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?, 65 J. FIN. 
2213, 2214 (2010). 
 27. Duffey, supra note 8, at 406; Bernhard Kuschnik, The Sarbanes Oxley Act:  “Big 
Brother Is Watching You” or Adequate Measures of Corporate Governance Regulation?, 5 
RUTGERS BUS. L.J. 64, 68 (2008). 
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extraordinary pressure to consistently beat analyst expectations and increase 
their company’s value.28  This dynamic created a “culture ripe for corporate 
fraud”29 that came home to roost in 2001 and 2002.  In those years, many 
corporations disclosed that they had used improper accounting practices to 
overstate their prior earnings by tens or hundreds of millions of dollars.30
Of these scandals, none had a greater impact on the development of SOX 
than the demise of Enron.
   
31  Enron was founded in 1930 as a gas pipeline 
company.32  By the late 1990s, it had completely shifted from a manager of 
physical assets to a provider and trader of energy resources, financial and 
risk management services, and electronic commerce.33  During this shift, 
Enron’s market capitalization increased from approximately $2 billion in 
the mid-1980s to approximately $70 billion in 2001.34
This success, however, was nothing more than a façade.
   
35  Through the 
use of difficult-to-trace partnerships and other accounting tricks,36 Enron 
was able to conceal its debt and growing losses until November 8, 2001, 
when it announced that it had overstated its earnings over the previous four 
years by $586 million.37  Then, on December 2, 2001, Enron filed what 
was, at the time, the largest corporate bankruptcy in United States history.38
Shortly thereafter, a government investigation revealed that one Enron 
employee, Sherron Watkins, had tried to blow the whistle on Enron’s 
improper accounting practices internally, but had been silenced.
   
39  In the 
spring of 2001, Ms. Watkins, then a vice president at Enron, was asked to 
examine the company’s books to find assets that could be sold in response 
to the stock market decline.40
 
 28. See Duffey, supra note 
  During this time, Ms. Watkins uncovered 
8, at 406; Kuschnik, supra note 27, at 68. 
 29. Duffey, supra note 8, at 406. 
 30. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 31. See, e.g., HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SARBANES-OXLEY ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 2 
(Donald C. Pingleton III et al. eds., 2009–2010 ed.) (observing that “the Enron demise 
triggered” SOX and that “[t]here have been few if any single corporate events that had the 
impact on securities regulation that can match the impact of the demise of Enron Corp.”). 
 32. JCT REPORT, supra note 3, at 57. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 57–58. 
 35. See S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 3 (2002) (“[T]hrough the use of sophisticated 
professional advice and complex financial structures, Enron . . . [was] able to paint for the 
investing public a very different picture of the company’s financial health than the true 
picture revealed.”); Greg Farrell, Watkins Set to Take the Stand Today, USA TODAY, Mar. 
15, 2006, at 3B (“Enron achieved its stunning earnings growth through questionable 
accounting gimmicks.”). 
 36. S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 2–3 (noting that Enron used “partnerships—with names like 
Jedi, Chewco, Rawhide, Ponderosa and Sundance . . . to cook the books and trick both the 
public and federal regulators about how well Enron was doing financially”). 
 37. John R. Emshwiller et al., Enron Slashes Profits Since 1997 by 20%, WALL ST. J., 
Nov. 9, 2001, at A3. 
 38. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 39. See Jennifer Frey, The Woman Who Saw Red, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2002, at C1. 
 40. Miriam A. Cherry, Whistling in the Dark?  Corporate Fraud, Whistleblowers, and 
the Implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Employment Law, 79 WASH. L. REV. 1029, 
1035 (2004). 
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some of Enron’s “fuzzy” accounting practices.41  However, she feared the 
ramifications of presenting her findings to Jeffrey Skilling, then Enron’s 
chief executive officer, or Andrew Fastow, then Enron’s chief financial 
officer.42  Therefore, Ms. Watkins began searching for a new job, and 
planned on confronting Mr. Skilling with her findings on her last day at 
Enron.43
Her plans changed, however, when Kenneth Lay returned as Enron’s 
chief executive officer on August 14, 2001, and invited employees to put 
any concerns about the company into a comment box.
 
44  Ms. Watkins 
placed an anonymous memo into the box, where she bluntly wrote that she 
was “incredibly nervous that [Enron would] implode in a wave of 
accounting scandals.”45  When Mr. Lay did not mention her concerns in a 
company-wide meeting the next day, Ms. Watkins arranged for a face-to-
face meeting with him on August 22, 2001.46  There, Ms. Watkins 
presented a longer and “more cataclysmic” memo to Mr. Lay that included 
an annotated partnership document where she wrote in the margin, “There it 
is!  This is the smoking gun.  You cannot do this!”47  Although Ms. 
Watkins felt that Mr. Lay had taken her concerns seriously, it was later 
revealed that, on the contrary, Enron had instead asked its outside legal 
counsel whether, under Texas law, it could terminate corporate 
whistleblowers like Ms. Watkins without legal liability.48  As it turns out, 
they could.49  When she later discovered that this was Enron’s reaction to 
her concerns, Ms. Watkins’s keen response was “Talk about shoot[ing] the 
messenger.”50
C.  Section 806 of SOX 
 
This section begins by outlining the text of section 806.  Then, it analyzes 
section 806’s legislative history.  Next, this section discusses how the 
Supreme Court uses a statute’s text and its legislative history to interpret its 
meaning.  Finally, this section concludes by discussing why whistleblowers 
have had such little success using section 806’s anti-retaliation provisions, 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. See The Financial Collapse of Enron—Part 3:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 107th Cong. 15 (2002) 
(testimony of Sherron Watkins) (“I was not comfortable confronting either Mr. Skilling or 
Mr. Fastow with my concerns.  To do so I believed would have been a job terminating 
move.”). 
 43. Morse & Bower, supra note 4, at 53, 55. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Don Van Natta Jr. with Alex Berenson, Enron’s Chairman Received Warning About 
Accounting, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2002, at A1. 
 46. Morse & Bower, supra note 4, at 53, 55. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Cherry, supra note 40, at 1037 (“The legal implication of this [inquiry] is clear. 
Evidently, someone at a high level of the company wanted to fire Watkins because of her 
willingness to come forward and discuss the accounting improprieties.”). 
 49. See S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 5 (2002). 
 50. Morse & Bower, supra note 4, at 53, 55. 
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and why the Dodd-Frank Act and SOX could potentially create a two-tiered 
whistleblower protection system. 
1.  The Text and Legislative History 
The text of section 806 provides, in part, that: 
No company . . . may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in 
any other manner discriminate against an employee . . . because of any 
lawful act done by the employee— 
 (1) to provide information, cause information to be provided, or 
otherwise assist in an investigation regarding any conduct which the 
employee reasonably believes constitutes a violation of [18 U.S.C. § 1341 
(mail fraud), 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (wire, radio, or TV fraud), 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1344 (bank fraud), or 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (securities fraud)], any rule or 
regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or any provision 
of Federal law relating to fraud against shareholders . . . .51
This language is identical to the whistleblower provision proposed in the 
Corporate & Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002,
 
52 which 
eventually became section 806 of SOX.53
The Enron scandal and Ms. Watkins’s story were referenced repeatedly 
in the Committee Report
 
54
 
 51. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2006) (emphasis added).  The full text of section 806, as 
codified, is: 
 and in the floor statements of Senator Patrick 
No company with a class of securities registered under section 12 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78L), or that is required to file reports under 
section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78(d)), or any 
officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent of such company, may 
discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate 
against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment because of any 
lawful act done by the employee— 
  (1) to provide information, cause information to be provided, or otherwise assist 
in an investigation regarding any conduct which the employee reasonably believes 
constitutes a violation of section 1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348, any rule or regulation 
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or any provision of Federal law 
relating to fraud against shareholders when the information or assistance is 
provided to or the investigation is conducted by— 
(A) a Federal regulatory or law enforcement agency; 
(B) any Member of Congress or any committee of Congress; or 
(C) a person with supervisory authority over the employee (or such other 
person working for the employer who has the authority to investigate, 
discover, or terminate misconduct); or 
  (2) to file, cause to be filed, testify, participate in, or otherwise assist in a 
proceeding filed or about to be filed (with any knowledge of the employer) relating 
to an alleged violation of section 1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348, any rule or regulation 
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or any provision of Federal law 
relating to fraud against shareholders. 
Id. 
 52. Compare Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, S. 2010, 107th 
Cong. § 6 (2002), with 18 U.S.C. § 1514A. 
 53. See STEPHEN M. KOHN ET AL., WHISTLEBLOWER LAW:  A GUIDE TO LEGAL 
PROTECTIONS FOR CORPORATE EMPLOYEES 4 (2004). 
 54. See S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 3, 5, 10, 19 (2002).  References in this Note to the 
Committee Report are to the Committee Report for the Corporate and Criminal Fraud 
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Leahy,55 one of section 806’s principal drafters.56  After learning about Ms. 
Watkins’s experience at Enron, Congress identified two key problems that 
they hoped section 806 would remedy.  First, federal law did not protect 
corporate whistleblowers from retaliation; instead, whistleblowers were 
protected by various states laws that sometimes provided insufficient legal 
protection.57  Second, whistleblowers were subject to a general corporate 
culture that discouraged and retaliated against whistleblowing.58  
Additionally, the Enron scandal demonstrated to Congress that corporate 
whistleblowers are indispensible to the discovery and prosecution of 
corporate fraud, and must be provided with sufficient legal protection to 
ensure that they will continue to aid investigators.59
Prior to the enactment of SOX, corporate whistleblowers were not 
protected from retaliation under federal law.
 
60  Instead, various state laws 
protected corporate whistleblowers.61  This created a legal environment in 
which two whistleblowers in different states could take the same action but 
have very different legal protections.62  Further, some state laws did not 
provide whistleblowers with sufficient legal protection,63 a fact that was 
often well known to employers.64  Congress believed that the current 
system of state law protection for whistleblowers was part of a “legal 
regime that, “on one hand, allowed [Enron’s] conduct to take place, and, on 
the other, may serve as an impediment to punishing all the wrongdoers and 
protecting all the victims.”65  Accordingly, Congress sought to remedy this 
problem by protecting corporate whistleblowers from retaliation under 
federal law through section 806 of SOX.66
 
Accountability Act of 2002, the whistleblower provision of which eventually became section 
806 of SOX. See supra note 
 
53 and accompanying text. 
 55. See 148 CONG. REC. 14,447 (2002) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy); id. at 12,318 
(statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy). 
 56. See id. at 12,318. 
 57. See S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 10. 
 58. See id. 
 59. 148 CONG. REC. 14,447 (noting that Congress learned from Sherron Watkins’s 
experience that “corporate insiders are the key witnesses that need to be encouraged to report 
fraud and help prove it in court. . . .  There is no way we could have known about [how the 
Enron scandal worked] without that kind of a whistleblower”); id. at 12,318 (“When 
sophisticated corporations set up complex fraud schemes, corporate insiders are often the 
only ones who can disclose what happened and why.”). 
 60. See S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 10. 
 61. See id. (observing that, prior to SOX, only “the patchwork and vagaries of current 
state laws” protected corporate whistleblowers). 
 62. See id. (observing that due to varying state laws “a whistleblowing employee in one 
state may be far more vulnerable to retaliation than a fellow employee in another state who 
takes the same actions”); see also State Whistleblower Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. 
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/labor/state-whistleblower-laws.html (last 
updated Nov. 2009) (describing the whistleblower protection laws of each state).  
 63. See 148 CONG. REC. 14,447 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (“Enron wanted to 
silence [Ms. Watkins] as a whistleblower because Texas law would allow them to do it.”).  
 64. See S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 19 (“[M]ost corporate employers, with help from their 
lawyers, know exactly what they can do to a whistleblowing employee under the law.”).  
 65. See id. at 6. 
 66. See id. 
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In  addition to lacking legal protection from retaliation under federal law 
prior to the enactment of SOX, corporate whistleblowers were also subject 
to a general corporate culture that discouraged and retaliated against 
whistleblowing.67  This culture permitted the perpetuation of corporate 
wrongdoing, hampered investigations, and presented serious risks to 
investors.68  Congress decided that this climate must be changed, and that 
legal protection for corporate whistleblowers under federal law could help 
lead the way.69
Aside from identifying legal flaws and cultural attitudes that should be 
changed, the Enron crisis also showed Congress that corporate 
whistleblowers play an indispensible role in corporate fraud investigations, 
because it is unlikely that the full scope of the Enron scandal would have 
been revealed without a whistleblower.
 
70  Accordingly, Congress believed 
that the whistleblower protections in section 806 were necessary to detect 
future corporate fraud and ensure that whistleblowers would continue to 
come forward and share information with investigators.71
Finally, with respect to section 806’s legal standard, the legislative 
history explains that section 806 was intended to impose a normal 
reasonable person standard, as it is used in a variety of legal contexts.
 
72  
Congress even cited a Third Circuit case, Passaic Valley Sewerage 
Commissioners v. Department of Labor,73 as an example of the standard it 
intended.74  In Passaic Valley, the court noted that “‘whistle-blower’ 
provisions are intended to promote a working environment in which 
employees are relatively free from the debilitating threat of employment 
reprisals for publicly asserting company violations of statutes.”75  The court 
went on to hold that “employees must be free from threats to their job 
security in retaliation for their good faith assertions” of corporate 
wrongdoing.76  Further, it noted that “an employee’s non-frivolous 
complaint should not have to be guaranteed to withstand the scrutiny of in-
house or external review in order to merit protection.”77
As a further analogy of the legal standard Congress intended, the 
legislative history also explained that section 806 was designed to provide 
corporate whistleblowers with legal protections under federal law that were 
similar to the protection provided to some government employees under the 
 
 
 67. See id. at 19. 
 68. See id. at 5. 
 69. See id. at 10. 
 70. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 71. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 72. See S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 19 (2002) (noting that “reasonably believe[s]” was 
“intended to impose the normal reasonable person standard used and interpreted in a wide 
variety of legal contexts”). 
 73. 992 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 74. See S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 19. 
 75. Passaic Valley, 992 F.2d at 478. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 479. 
2052 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
Whistleblower Protection Act78 (WPA).  The WPA provides that it is 
unlawful to retaliate against certain government employees79 because they 
disclosed information that they “reasonably believe[] evidences—(i) a 
violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or (ii) gross mismanagement, a 
gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific 
danger to public health or safety.”80  This statutory language “requires only 
that the whistleblower had a reasonable belief that, for example, a rule or 
regulation had been violated, in order for the disclosure of such violations 
to be protected.”81
2.  Using the Text and Legislative History to Interpret Section 806 
 
This section begins by discussing several empirical studies of the 
Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation jurisprudence, which suggest that 
the text of a statute and its legislative history are two of the most important 
tools of statutory interpretation.  This section then analyzes how the Court 
uses the text and legislative history of a statute to interpret its meaning. 
It was famously stated more than half a century ago that “[t]he hard truth 
of the matter is that American courts have no intelligible, generally 
accepted, and consistently applied theory of statutory interpretation.”82  
Many agree that this statement is as true today as it was then.83  
Nevertheless, several empirical studies tracking which tools the Supreme 
Court uses most frequently to interpret statutes indicate that the text of a 
statute and its legislative history are two of the most frequently cited 
sources of statutory meaning.84  Accordingly, although it may be true that 
there is no coherent theory to statutory interpretation, it can be said with 
confidence that the text and legislative history of a statute are two of the 
most important tools of statutory interpretation.85
 
 78. See S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 19 (“Although current law [the WPA] protects many 
government employees who act in the public interest by reporting wrongdoing, there is no 
similar protection for employees of publicly traded companies.”). 
 
 79. See 5 U.S.C. § 2105 (2006). 
 80. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A)(i)–(ii). 
 81. Horton v. Dep’t of the Navy, 66 F.3d 279, 283 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 82. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:  BASIC PROBLEMS IN 
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF THE LAW 1169 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. 
Frickey eds., 1994). 
 83. See Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory 
Interpretation Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863, 1866 (2008) (“Scholars and judges, 
including Justice Scalia . . . have agreed that [Hart’s and Sacks’s statement] continues to be 
an ‘accurate[] descri[ption]’ of American courts.”); Philip P. Frickey, Interpretive-Regime 
Change, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1971, 1971 (2005) (observing that Hart’s and Sacks’s 
statement “remains true today”). 
 84. Frank B. Cross, The Significance of Statutory Interpretive Methodologies, 82 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1971, 2001 (2007) (finding that a statute’s text and the legislature’s intent 
were “far and away the most frequently used” tools of statutory interpretation used by the 
Supreme Court); Anita S. Krishnakumar, Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts Court’s 
First Era:  An Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 221, 236 tbl.1 (2010). 
 85. See id. 
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The Supreme Court has often stated that all statutory interpretation 
inquiries must begin with the language of the statute.86  An analysis of the 
statute’s language considers the statutory context87 and the meaning of the 
statute’s text, either through statutory definitions or, if undefined, through 
the ordinary meaning of the terms.88  When there is no ambiguity in a 
statute’s language, “the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according 
to its terms,”89 and the Supreme Court “ordinarily resist[s] reading words or 
elements into a statute that do not appear on its face.”90  Therefore, absent 
some ambiguity in the statutory language, a court’s statutory interpretation 
analysis should begin and end with the text.91
 
 86. See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 431 (2000) (“We start, as always, with 
the language of the statute.” (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 
(1989))).  Some have suggested that this approach is mandated by the Constitution which, 
“properly understood, requires judges to treat the clear import of an enacted text as 
conclusive.” John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 70, 73 (2006); see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452–53 (1987) (Scalia, 
J., concurring) (“Judges interpret laws rather than reconstruct legislators’ intentions.”); 
William N. Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 654 (1990) (“Justice 
Scalia has emphasized that any search for legislative intent through examination of 
legislative history is in tension with article I’s structure . . . .”). 
  For example, in two recent 
 87. See McNeill v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2218, 2221 (2011) (“As in all statutory 
construction cases, we begin with ‘the language itself [and] the specific context in which that 
language is used.’” (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997))). For an 
example of using statutory context to interpret a statute, see United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 
472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972) (“[W]here Congress includes particular language in one 
section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed 
that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”); 
accord Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 528 (2003). 
 88. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 431 (“We give the words of a statute their ‘ordinary, 
contemporary, common meaning,’ absent an indication Congress intended them to bear 
some different import.” (quoting Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 207 
(1997)) (second level quotation omitted)). 
 89. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917); accord Hartford Underwriters 
Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000). 
 90. Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29 (1997). 
 91. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999) (“As in any case of 
statutory construction, our analysis begins with ‘the language of the statute.’ And where the 
statutory language provides a clear answer, it ends there as well.” (quoting Estate of Cowart 
v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475 (1992))); Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 
249, 253–54 (1992) (“We have stated time and again that courts must presume that a 
legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.  When 
the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last:  ‘judicial 
inquiry is complete.’” (quoting Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981))).  There 
are some indications that although this rule was often breached, it has recently taken on 
renewed significance. See YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-589, STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION:  GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 2 (2008), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf (“It was once axiomatic that [the plain meaning 
rule] was honored more in the breach than in the observance.  However, the Court has begun 
to place more emphasis on statutory text and less emphasis on legislative history and other 
sources ‘extrinsic’ to that text.  More often than before, statutory text is the ending point as 
well as the starting point for interpretation.”); see also Krishnakumar, supra note 84, at 235–
36 tbl.1 (finding, in a study of the Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation cases between 
2005 and 2008 that the text or plain meaning of a statute was the most frequently cited tool 
of statutory interpretation). 
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decisions, the Court refused to read limiting language into statutes.92  
However, the Court has developed a recent habit of turning to the 
legislative history of a statute to confirm its plain meaning, even when the 
language of the statute is clear93—a practice that has drawn the ire of 
Justice Antonin Scalia.94
When a statute is unclear or ambiguous, the Court is “at liberty” to rely 
on legislative history to interpret the statutory language in question.
 
95  
Indeed, it is “commonplace” for the Court to refer to legislative history for 
background information and historical context,96 or to provide meaning to 
specific ambiguous or unclear statutory language.97  However, there are 
many different forms of legislative history, and the Court does not give 
each of these sources equal weight.98  Committee reports are the most 
authoritative source of legislative history,99
 
 92. See Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 2149, 2156 (2010) (holding 
that the statute in question was clear on its face, and that, therefore, the circuit court’s 
decision to read limiting language into the statute was improper); Dean v. United States, 129 
S. Ct. 1849, 1853–55 (2009) (refusing to read an unwritten intent element into the statute in 
question because it did not “contain words of limitation”). 
 and it is therefore not surprising 
 93. See James J. Brudney, Confirmatory Legislative History, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 901, 
901 (2011) (“[T]he [Roberts] Court . . . often departs from its ‘first canon’ by relying on 
legislative history to confirm or reinforce what it already has concluded is the plain meaning 
of [the] statutory text.”); id. at 902 n.4 (collecting cases where the Roberts Court has used 
legislative history to confirm its textual statutory interpretation). 
 94. See Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 510–11 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(harshly criticizing the Court’s use of confirmatory legislative history because it 
“conflicts . . . with this Court’s repeated statements that when the language of a statute is 
plain, legislative history is irrelevant,” because while “[i]t may seem that there is no harm” 
in using legislative sources that “are merely in accord with the plain meaning of the Act . . . .  
[it] has addictive consequences” and because “the use of legislative history is illegitimate 
and ill advised in the interpretation of any statute—and especially a statute that is clear on its 
face”); see also Brudney, supra note 93, at 902 nn.4–6 (collecting cases in which the 
Supreme Court’s practice of using legislative history to confirm a statute’s plain meaning 
has drawn a sharp rebuke from Justice Scalia). 
 95. See United States v. Great N. Ry. Co., 287 U.S. 144, 154 (1932) (“In aid of the 
process of [statutory] construction we are at liberty, if the meaning be uncertain, to have 
recourse to the legislative history of the measure and the statements by those in charge of it 
during its consideration by the Congress.”). But see Zedner, 547 U.S. at 511 (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he use of legislative history is illegitimate and ill advised in the 
interpretation of any statute . . . .”). 
 96. See KIM, supra note 91, at 42. 
 97. See Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Or., 515 U.S. 687, 
704–06 (1995) (relying on a committee report to explain the meaning of the word “take” in 
the Endangered Species Act); Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 581–82 (1995) (using 
legislative history to support interpreting the term “prospectus” in the Securities Act to be as 
limited to initial public offerings); Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 179–83 (1993) 
(using legislative history to interpret the term “conduct” of racketeering activity in the RICO 
Act as limited to persons who participate in the operation or management of the enterprise in 
question). 
 98. See Eskridge, supra note 86, at 636–40; see also Krishnakumar, supra note 84, at 
237 (observing that different forms of legislative history were cited with different levels of 
frequency). 
 99. See Eskridge, supra note 86, at 637; see also Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 
76 (1984) (“[W]e have repeatedly stated that the authoritative source for finding the 
Legislature’s intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill.”); Statutory Interpretation and 
the Uses of Legislative History:  Hearing Before Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop. & 
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that it is also the most cited.100  The next most authoritative source is a 
statement from the bill’s sponsor.101  The final compelling source of 
legislative history is statutory language that Congress considered but 
rejected.102  The remaining sources of legislative history—such as floor 
statements by non-sponsors, the statements of non-legislative officials (for 
example, law professors, executive branch members, and lobbying groups), 
legislative silence, and subsequent legislative history—are relevant, but 
often not considered as important as the aforementioned sources.103  For 
example, the Supreme Court is often unwilling to equate congressional 
inaction with congressional acquiescence to, or endorsement of, a judicial 
interpretation of a statute, unless it is quite clear that Congress was aware of 
the interpretation and chose not to act.104
 
the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 1, 21 (1990) (statement 
of James L. Buckley, former Sen. and D.C. Circuit Judge) (“[M]y understanding of most of 
the legislation I voted on [while a U.S. Senator] was based entirely on my reading of its 
language and, where necessary, on explanations contained in the accompanying report.”).  
As former member of the U.S. House of Representatives and D.C. Circuit Court Judge  
Abner J. Mikva explained, “The committee report is the bone structure of the legislation.  It 
is the road map that explains why things are in and things are out of the statute.” Abner J. 
Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, 28 S. TEX. L. REV. 181, 184 (1986) 
 
 100. See Eskridge, supra note 86, at 637; see also Krishnakumar, supra note 84, at 237 
(observing that when at least one opinion in a case referenced legislative history, 60.9 
percent of the references were to committee reports, nearly double the next closest legislative 
history source). 
 101. See Eskridge, supra note 86, at 638 (noting that a sponsor’s statements are 
authoritative “because the sponsors are the Members of Congress most likely to know what 
the proposed legislation is all about, and other Members can be expected to pay special heed 
to their characterizations of the legislation”); see also N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 
U.S. 512, 526–27 (1982) (“[R]emarks . . . of the sponsor of the language ultimately enacted, 
are an authoritative guide to the statute’s construction.”). 
 102. See Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 392–93 (1980) 
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (“Few principles of statutory construction are more compelling than 
the proposition that Congress does not intend sub silentio to enact statutory language that it 
has earlier discarded in favor of other language.”); accord INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 
421, 442–43 (1987); see also Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 740–41 (2001) (holding that 
the elimination of “the very term” relied on by the Supreme Court in an earlier case 
suggested that Congress desired to preclude that result in future cases); United States v. 
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 136–37 (1985) (noting the significance of the 
Conference Committee’s selection of the Senate’s broad definition of “navigable waters,” 
rather than the House’s narrower definition); United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 
344 U.S. 218, 222 (1952) (“[T]he specific history of the legislative process that culminated 
in the [statute at issue] affords . . . solid ground for giving it appropriate meaning.”). 
 103. See Eskridge, supra note 86, at 639–40. 
 104. See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 750 (2006) (“Congress takes no 
governmental action except by legislation. . . .  To be sure, we have sometimes relied on 
congressional acquiescence when there is evidence that Congress considered and rejected the 
‘precise issue’ presented before the Court.  However, ‘[a]bsent such overwhelming evidence 
of acquiescence, we are loath to replace the plain text and original understanding of a statute 
with an amended agency interpretation.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Solid Waste Agency of 
N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 169 n.5 (2001))). 
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3.  Public Policy Concerns and Section 806 
This section discusses two important public policy considerations.  First, 
this section analyzes the lack of success whistleblowers have had using 
section 806’s anti-retaliation provisions, and the role that the “definitively 
and specifically” standard has played in curbing section 806’s effectiveness.  
Second, this section analyzes the similarities and differences between the 
SOX and the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower protections. 
a.  Section 806 in Action:  Less Than Advertised 
There is little disagreement that, on its face, section 806 is very favorable 
to employees.105  In practice, however, many commentators have noted that 
whistleblowers rarely win section 806 retaliation cases at the administrative 
level.106
In the most probing empirical study of section 806 claims, Professor 
Richard Moberly found that a narrow interpretation of protected activity 
was a major cause of whistleblowers’ inability to make use of section 806’s 
anti-retaliation protections.
 
107
 
 105. See Private Sector Whistleblowers:  Are There Sufficient Legal Protections?  
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Workforce Protections of the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 
110th Cong. 40 (2007) (statement of Lloyd Chinn, Partner, Proskauer Rose) (“[T]he 
Sarbanes-Oxley antiretaliation provisions are very favorable as they are written today for 
employees.  The burden of proof . . . is very low.”); accord id. at 45 (statement of Tom 
Devine, Legal Director, Government Accountability Project); Richard E. Moberly, 
Unfulfilled Expectations:  An Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers 
Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 83 (2007) (“As written, Sarbanes-Oxley appears to 
provide strong substantive and procedural protections for whistleblowers.”). 
  Professor Moberly’s study covered the 491 
section 806 complaints that the Occupational Safety and Health 
 106. See Beverley H. Earle & Gerald A. Madek, The Mirage of Whistleblower Protection 
Under Sarbanes-Oxley:  A Proposal for Change, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 19–24 (2007); 
Moberly, supra note 105, at 67; Jennifer Levitz, Whistleblowers Are Left Dangling:  
Technicality Leads Labor Department to Dismiss Cases, WALL ST. J., Sept. 4, 2008, at A3 
(“The government has ruled in favor of whistleblowers 17 times out of 1,273 complaints 
filed since 2002, according to department records.  Another 841 cases have been 
dismissed.”); Deborah Solomon, For Financial Whistle-Blowers, New Shield Is an Imperfect 
One, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2004, at A1. 
 107. Moberly, supra note 105, at 90 (“I conclude that employees rarely won because 
OSHA and the ALJs determined that a large percentage of employees failed to prove a 
Sarbanes-Oxley claim as a matter of law, often by narrowly construing the Act’s legal 
parameters.”); id. at 113–14 (“In 24.1% of the cases in which an ALJ found in favor of the 
employer, the ALJ held that the employee did not engage in protected activity because the 
whistleblower’s disclosure did not relate to one of [the] statutorily defined illegal activities.  
OSHA relied on this rationale in 18.2% of the cases in which the employer prevailed.”); see 
also Valerie Watnick, Whistleblower Protections Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act:  A Primer 
and a Critique, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 831, 832 (2007) (“[D]espite Sarbanes-Oxley 
being touted as a new bulwark against corporate fraud, the courts continue to weaken these 
whistleblower provisions. . . . [W]histleblower protections have not accomplished their 
intended purpose.”); Rachel Beller, Note, Whistleblower Protection Legislation of the East 
and West:  Can It Really Reduce Corporate Fraud and Improve Corporate Governance?  A 
Study of the Successes and Failures of Whistleblower Protection Legislation in the US and 
China, 7 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 873, 908 (2011) (“[T]he [Department of Labor] has interpreted 
section 806 in such a narrow manner that the purpose of US SOX to encourage and protect 
corporate whistleblowers has been seriously undermined.”). 
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Administration (OSHA) received108 between August 19, 2002 and July 13, 
2005.109  Of these 491 complaints, OSHA reached a final determination in 
361 cases (the others were withdrawn, settled, or, in one case, sent to 
arbitration), and found that the employer violated section 806 only thirteen 
times—about a 3.6 percent win rate for employees.110  Those employees 
who lost at the OSHA level requested review by an Administrative Law 
Judge111 (ALJ) in 230 cases.112  An ALJ reached a decision in 93 of these 
cases (the others were withdrawn or settled),113 but found that the employer 
violated section 806 only six times—about a 6.5 percent win rate for 
employees.114  To provide some context, these win rates are two to three 
times lower than plaintiff win rates under discrimination laws handled by 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,115 which are notoriously 
difficult cases to win.116  Most pertinent to this Note, however, was 
Professor Moberly’s finding that failure to engage in protected activity was 
the third most cited element in employer wins at both the OSHA and ALJ 
levels.117
 
 108. Although section 806 charged the Department of Labor with the responsibility to 
receive claims in the first instance, see 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(1) (2006), the Secretary of 
Labor delegated this responsibility to OSHA, see Secretary’s Order 5-2002, 67 Fed. Reg. 
65,008 (Oct. 22, 2002). 
 
 109. Moberly, supra note 105, at 87. 
 110. Id. at 96 tbl.3.  Although the “win rate” in Professor Moberly’s table includes cases 
that were settled or withdrawn prior to final adjudication by OSHA, the win rate listed in this 
Note does not because of the uncertainty regarding whether the settled cases had merit, 
particularly because OSHA and the OALJ have not provided the dollar amount of section 
806 settlements. See id. at 97–98. 
 111. An ALJ is responsible for “conducting formal proceedings, interpreting the law, 
applying agency regulations, and carrying out the policies of the agency in the course of 
administrative adjudications.” See MORRELL E. MULLINS, MANUAL FOR ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW JUDGES 2–3 (Interim Internet ed. 2001), available at http://ualr.edu/malj/malj.pdf.  The 
Supreme Court has opined that ALJs are comparable to judges. See Butz v. Economou, 438 
U.S. 478, 513 (1978) (“There can be little doubt that the role of the 
modern . . . administrative law judge . . . is ‘functionally comparable’ to that of a judge.  His 
powers are often, if not generally, comparable to those of a trial judge:  He may issue 
subpoenas, rule on proffers of evidence, regulate the course of the hearing, and make or 
recommend decisions.  More importantly, the process of agency adjudication is currently 
structured so as to assure that the hearing examiner exercises his independent judgment on 
the evidence before him, free from pressures by the parties or other officials within the 
agency.”). 
 112. Moberly, supra note 105, at 96. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id.; note that, although the “win rate” in Professor Moberly’s table includes cases 
that were settled or withdrawn prior to final adjudication by an ALJ, the win rate listed in 
this Note does not because of the uncertainty regarding whether settled cases had merit, 
particularly because OSHA and the OALJ have not provided the dollar amount of section 
806 settlements. See id. at 97–98. 
 115. Id. at 93. 
 116. See Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 
555, 557–60 (2001). 
 117. Moberly, supra note 105, at 102 (finding that failure to engage in protected activity 
was cited in 59 employer wins at the OSHA level (about 18.2 percent of cases) and in 20 
employers wins at the ALJ level (about 24 percent of cases); only statute of limitations and 
causation issues were cited more often). 
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b.  The Dodd-Frank Act’s Whistleblower Protections 
The Dodd-Frank Act was passed after the 2008 financial crisis in 
response to the perceived weakness of banking regulations, and was 
perhaps the most significant and wide-reaching expansion of financial 
regulation since the Great Depression.118  The Act reached “every corner” 
of the banking industry,119 and included barely noticed120 amendments to 
section 806 of SOX that expanded the definition of “employer” and 
extended the statute of limitations.121
The Dodd-Frank Act also created new whistleblower anti-retaliation 
protections
 
122 for whistleblowers who report potential corporate 
wrongdoing directly to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).123  
The final rules that the SEC promulgated to enforce these new 
whistleblower protections defined a whistleblower as a person who 
“possesses a reasonable belief that the information he is providing relates to 
a possible securities law violation.”124  This “reasonable belief” standard 
“requires that the employee hold a subjectively genuine belief that the 
information demonstrates a possible violation, and that this belief is one 
that a similarly situated employee might reasonably possess.”125  The SEC 
required only a “reasonable belief” because it felt that this standard struck 
the appropriate balance between encouraging quality tips while 
discouraging frivolous ones.126
 
 118. See Hartmann, supra note 
  Additionally, the SEC stated that this 
22, at 1279. 
 119. Damian Paletta & Aaron Lucchetti, Law Remakes U.S. Financial Landscape, WALL 
ST. J., July 16, 2010, at A1. 
 120. Recent Legislation, Corporate Law—Securities Regulation—Congress Expands 
Incentives for Whistleblowers to Report Suspected Violations to the SEC., 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 1829, 1830 (2011) (“Although the progress of the Dodd-Frank bill through the House 
and Senate was marked by intense industry lobbying and divisive partisan struggles, the 
whistleblower provisions received little attention on the road to passage.”); Bruce Carton, 
Pitfalls Emerge in Dodd-Frank Bounty Provision, SEC. DOCKET (Sept. 8, 2010), 
http://www.securitiesdocket.com/2010/09/09/pitfalls-emerge-in-dodd-frank-whistleblower-
bounty-provision/ (describing the whistleblower section of the Dodd-Frank Act as a “little-
known sleeper section”). 
 121. See Procedures for the Handling of Retaliation Complaints Under Section 806 of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, as Amended, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,084, 68,085 (Nov. 3, 2011) (to 
be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1980). 
 122. See Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922, 124 Stat. 1376, 1841 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78u-6 (Supp. IV 2010)). 
 123. See id.; see also Recent Legislation, supra note 120, at 1830 (“[R]ather than 
strengthening [whistleblower anti-retaliation] protections across the board [Dodd-Frank] 
actually creates a two-tiered system of retaliation protection in which whistleblowers may 
receive stronger, more robust protection if they report directly to the SEC, but weaker, less 
reliable protection if they report to the company.”).  Some have expressed concerns that the 
Dodd-Frank Act “discourages internal reporting and thus will likely undermine internal 
compliance and reporting systems and impede the effective functioning of the securities 
regulation system,” and will “leaving those who report internally either unprotected or 
protected only by the weaker protections of SOX.” Id. at 1830–32. 
 124. See Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 
34,303 (June 13, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b)). 
 125. Id. at 34,303. 
 126. Id. 
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standard was consistent with the approach that is followed by courts that 
have interpreted the anti-retaliation provisions of other federal laws.127
Although section 806 does not define the term whistleblower, its text, 
like the SEC’s rules,
 
128 provides that employees are protected when they 
report conduct that they reasonably believe relates to corporate 
wrongdoing.129  Despite this similarity, there are important differences 
between the whistleblower protections under section 806 and the Dodd-
Frank Act.  First, the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower protections only 
apply to employees who report corporate wrongdoing directly to the 
SEC.130  Next, whistleblowers under the Dodd-Frank Act may bring their 
claim directly into federal court and do not have to first file a claim with an 
administrative agency.131  Finally, Dodd-Frank whistleblowers have the 
opportunity to receive a portion of the monetary sanctions collected by the 
SEC resulting from their tip.132  These distinctions have caused some 
concern that a two-tiered whistleblower protection system has been 
created.133
D.  The Impact of an Administrative Agency’s Interpretation of a Statute:  
Doctrinally Neat, but Practically Messy 
 
This section begins by analyzing the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Chevron and its progeny, which suggest that the ARB’s decision to adopt 
the “reasonably believes” standard should be entitled to Chevron deference.  
Next, this section analyzes several empirical studies of Supreme Court 
decisions, which indicate that the Supreme Court treats Chevron as a canon 
of statutory interpretation rather than a precedent with stare decisis effect.  
These studies suggest that, in cases where Chevron should apply, the Court 
is nearly as likely to engage in ad hoc statutory interpretation as it is to 
defer to the agency’s decision. 
 
 127. Id. at 34,403–04. 
 128. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 129. See supra note 51. 
 130. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.  By contrast, section 806 protects 
employees who report wrongdoing to a broader range of authorities. See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1514A(a) (2006). 
 131. See Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922, 124 Stat. 1376, 1841 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(i) (Supp. IV 2010)). Whistleblowers under section 806 must first file their 
claim with OSHA and can only remove their claim to federal court if a final administrative 
determination is not made within 180 days. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b).  The opportunity to 
remove, however, is almost always available to whistleblowers. See Moberly, supra note 
105, at 82 (noting that the option to remove to federal court “almost certainly will be 
available for employees, because it is unlikely that the entire process will be completed in 
[180 days]; in Fiscal Year 2005, an initial OSHA investigation itself took an average of 127 
days to complete”). 
 132. See Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. at 34,363–71. 
 133. See Recent Legislation, supra note 120, at 1829–31. 
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1.  Doctrinal Clarity:  Chevron Deference to the ARB’s Interpretation 
of Section 806 
In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,134 
the Supreme Court established a two-step framework for courts to follow 
when reviewing an administrative agency’s interpretation of a statute.135  
First, the court must determine “whether Congress has directly spoken to 
the precise question at issue.”136  If so, the courts and the administrative 
agency “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress.”137  If, however, Congress has not spoken directly on the issue 
and has delegated enforcement authority to an administrative agency, then 
“Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill,”138 and courts are 
not free to impose their own interpretation of the statute.139  Instead, the 
courts must defer to the agency’s interpretation, provided that it is 
permissible under the statute.140  This is known as “Chevron deference.”141  
Importantly, however, an agency interpretation of a statute only qualifies 
for Chevron deference if Congress has delegated the authority to administer 
the statute to the administrative agency in question.142  This is established 
when, for example, Congress delegates the authority to formally adjudicate 
claims under the statute to an administrative agency.143
Congress explicitly delegated authority to enforce section 806 of SOX 
through formal adjudication to the Secretary of Labor,
 
144 who then 
delegated this authority to the ARB.145
 
 134. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
  Therefore, the ARB’s decision to 
 135. See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy?  An 
Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 824 (2006) (“Chevron famously 
established a two-step inquiry for courts to follow in reviewing agency interpretations of 
law.”). 
 136. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. 
 137. Id. at 843. 
 138. Id. at 843–44. 
 139. Id. at 843 (“If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed 
the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the 
statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.”). 
 140. Id.  
 141. See, e.g., Howard L. Dorfman et al., Presumption of Innocence:  FDA’s Authority to 
Regulate the Specifics of Prescription Drug Labeling and the Preemption Debate, 61 FOOD 
& DRUG L.J. 585, 598 (2006). 
 142. See United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (“We hold that 
administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron 
deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make 
rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was 
promulgated in the exercise of that authority.  Delegation of such authority may be shown in 
a variety of ways, as by an agency’s power to engage in adjudication . . . .”). 
 143. See id. at 227. 
 144. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(A) (2006) (providing that section 806 claims will be 
governed by the procedural rules set out at 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b) (2006), which explains the 
Department of Labor’s adjudicatory power). 
 145. See 67 Fed. Reg. 64,272–73 (Oct. 17, 2002). 
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adopt the “reasonably believes” standard should be entitled to Chevron 
deference.146
Two issues could have complicated the ARB’s eligibility for Chevron 
deference, however.  First, the ARB changed its interpretation of the scope 
of protected activity under section 806.
 
147  The Supreme Court initially 
struggled to decide whether and to what extent this should impact Chevron 
deference.148  At first, the Court seemed to indicate that an evolving agency 
interpretation had to satisfy a heightened standard to be eligible for 
deference.149  In 2009, however, the Supreme Court held that there is no 
heightened standard that must be satisfied for a changed agency 
interpretation to qualify for Chevron deference.150  Instead, the agency’s 
interpretation remains entitled to deference so long as the agency provides a 
reasoned explanation for its change, displays an awareness that it is 
changing its position, sets forth good reasons for the change, believes that 
the new policy is better (which can be shown simply through a conscious 
change of course), and demonstrates that the new interpretation or policy is 
permissible under the statute in question.151
Second, some jurisdictions adopted the reasonably believes standard for 
reasons other than Chevron deference, creating binding precedent that 
conflicts with the ARB’s current interpretation of section 806.
 
152
 
 146. See Welch v. Chao, 536 F.3d 269, 276 n.2 (4th Cir. 2008) (affording Chevron 
deference to the “definitively and specifically” standard because Congress enabled the ARB 
to speak with the force of law when it explicitly delegated the authority to enforce section 
806 to the Secretary of Labor, who then delegated this authority to the ARB); Getman v. 
Admin. Review Bd., 265 F. App’x 317, 320 n.7 (5th Cir. 2008) (“We have not addressed 
Chevron deference in the context of an ARB decision on Sarbanes-Oxley.  It appears that 
Chevron deference is due, as the ARB is an adjudicative body, but we leave that question for 
another day.”). 
  In 2005, 
however, the Court held that a jurisdiction’s prior precedent does not trump 
a conflicting agency interpretation of a statute that is entitled to Chevron 
deference unless that prior precedent was based on the unambiguous terms 
 147. Compare supra note 14 and accompanying text, with supra notes 15–16 and 
accompanying text. 
 148. See Randy J. Kozel & Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Administrative Change, 59 UCLA L. 
REV. 112, 114 (2011) (“Over the past three decades, the U.S. Supreme Court has struggled to 
find an answer” to the question of how Chevron deference is impacted by an agency’s 
decision to change its prior position). 
 149. See, e.g., Motor Vehicles Mfr. Assoc. of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. 
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983) (“[A]n agency changing its course . . . is obligated to supply a 
reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which may be required when an agency does 
not act in the first instance.”). 
 150. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1810 (2009) (“We find no 
basis . . . for a requirement that all agency change be subjected to more searching review.”). 
 151. See id. at 1811. 
 152. See Allen v. Admin. Review Bd., 514 F.3d 468, 476–77 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that 
the court “agree[s] with the ARB’s legal conclusion that an employee’s complaint must 
‘definitively and specifically relate’ to” one of the rules, regulations, or laws listed in section 
806); Vodopia v. Koniklijke Philips Elecs., N.V., 398 F. App’x 659, 662–63 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(“As numerous courts have observed . . . to qualify as protected activity, the ‘employee’s 
communications must definitively and specifically relate’” to one of the rules, regulations, or 
laws listed in section 806 (quoting Van Asdale v. Int’l Game Tech., 577 F.3d 989, 996–97 
(9th Cir. 2009))). 
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of the statute in question.153  Here, the precedents that conflict with the 
ARB’s current interpretation of section 806 were not based SOX’s 
unambiguous terms.154
 
  Therefore, these precedents do not threaten the 
Chevron eligibility of the ARB’s decision to adopt the reasonably believes 
standard. 
2.  The Murky Reality:  In Cases Where Chevron Should Apply, Courts Are 
as Likely to Engage in Ad Hoc Statutory Interpretation as They Are to 
Defer to the Agency’s Decision  
There are only two empirical studies that have analyzed the Supreme 
Court’s application of Chevron.155  In the first, Professor Thomas Merrill 
analyzed the ninety Supreme Court decisions between the 1984 term and 
the 1990 term that presented the Court with a Chevron deference 
question,156 and found that the Court accorded Chevron deference to the 
agency’s decision slightly less often than it applied traditional statutory 
interpretation principles.157  In the second, more comprehensive study,158 
which has been described as “path-breaking,”159 Professor William 
Eskridge and Lauren Baer analyzed all of the Supreme Court’s decisions 
that involved a federal agency interpretation of a statute between Chevron 
in 1983 and Hamdan in 2005.160
 
 153. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982–
83 (2005). 
  They found that in 53.6 percent of these 
cases, the Supreme Court did not invoke any deference regime, and instead 
 154. See supra note 152 and accompanying text (observing that the Fifth and Second 
Circuits adopted the “definitively and specifically” standard because they agreed with the 
ARB and other courts, respectively, that had also adopted this standard, not because of the 
unambiguous text of section 806). 
 155. See Raso & Eskridge, supra note 19 at 1738 (2010).  Although a third study by 
Professors Thomas Miles and Cass Sunstein examined cases where the Supreme Court cited 
Chevron, Miles & Sunstein, supra note 135, at 825, their study is not comprehensive because 
it “did not examine the larger universe of Supreme Court cases where Chevron was 
applicable but not cited,” Raso & Eskridge, supra note 19, at 1740. 
 156. See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 
969, 980–81 (1992). 
 157. See id. at 981 tbl.1 (finding that out of the ninety cases where a deference question 
was presented, the Court applied the Chevron framework in 32 cases (36 percent of the time) 
and applied traditional statutory interpretation principles in 34 cases (37 percent of the 
time)). 
 158. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 18, at 1093–94 (“[R]elatively few studies have 
attempted to empirically examine the application of the Chevron doctrine, and none has 
attempted to examine the Supreme Court’s Chevron jurisprudence systematically in light of 
the entire universe of potential deference cases.  Those studies that have focused on Chevron 
can be described as partial or incomplete, at best. . . .  Given these features, previous studies 
are of limited value. . . .  Our study attempts to fill this empirical gap and provide a more 
comprehensive analysis of Supreme Court deference practice.”); see also Raso & Eskridge, 
supra note 19, at 1740 (“The Eskridge and Baer study presented a more comprehensive 
survey of the Court’s treatment of deference regimes and deference decisions [than previous 
studies].”). 
 159. Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, How Not to Lie with Judicial Votes:  
Misconceptions, Measurements, and Models, 98 CAL. L. REV. 813, 843 (2010). 
 160. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 18, at 1094. 
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engaged in ad hoc judicial reasoning that mirrored the Supreme Court’s 
standard statutory interpretation practices.161  Eskridge and Baer stated that 
their “data provide strong empirical support for the fact that this ad hoc 
method of statutory interpretation exists and thrives in the administrative 
realm.”162  Further, in the 267 cases they analyzed where the agency 
interpretation in question was pursuant to a congressional delegation of 
lawmaking authority, and thus should have been entitled to Chevron 
deference,163 the Supreme Court applied Chevron only slightly more often 
than it engaged in traditional statutory interpretation.164  Finally, in a 
follow-up study, Professors Raso and Eskridge argued that this data 
demonstrates that the Supreme Court does not treat Chevron as a precedent 
that has stare decisis effect.165
II.  THE ARB’S EVOLVING INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 806 OF SOX 
 
This part analyzes the ARB’s evolving interpretation of the scope of 
protected activity under section 806 of SOX.  First, it discusses the origins 
of the “definitively and specifically” standard and its application to section 
806 by the ARB in Platone v. FLYi, Inc.  Then, this part analyzes the 
“reasonably believes” standard by discussing its origins and the ARB’s 
decision to abandon the “definitively and specifically” standard in favor of 
the “reasonably believes” standard in Sylvester v. Parexel International, 
LLC. 
A.  The “Definitively and Specifically” Standard 
The phrase “definitively and specifically” does not appear in the text of 
section 806.166  Instead, this standard is derived from American Nuclear 
Resources, Inc. v. Department of Labor,167 a Sixth Circuit case holding that 
to engage in protected activity under the whistleblower protection 
provisions of the Energy Reorganization Act168
 
 161. See id. at 1099 tbl.1; id. at 1117 (“[T]he [Supreme] Court’s methodology in these 
no-deference cases matches what has long been the Court’s standard methodology for 
interpreting statutes.  Under this ‘independent judgment of judges’ methodology, the Court 
normally considers statutory text and the whole act; legislative history and statutory purpose; 
the evolution of the statute through judicial and other precedents; and substantive policy 
canons when it interprets statutes.”). 
 (ERA), an employee must 
report information that “definitively and specifically” relates to safety 
 162. Id. at 1118. 
 163. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 164. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 18, at 1126; id. at 1128 tbl.6. 
 165. See Raso & Eskridge, supra note 19, at 1764 (“[P]reliminary results also cast doubt 
on the strongest version of the legal model for judicial decisionmaking in agency 
interpretation cases:  that Chevron and other formal deference regimes are rigorously 
followed as a matter of stare decisis.”); id. at 1797 (“Justices rarely treat Chevron as a 
precedent entitled to strict stare decisis effect . . . .”). 
 166. See supra note 51. 
 167. 134 F.3d 1292 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 168. See 42 U.S.C. § 5841(a) (2006). 
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violations.169  The ARB would later adopt this standard to govern the scope 
of protected activity for ERA whistleblower cases.170
In Platone v. FLYi, Inc.,
 
171 the ARB applied the “definitively and 
specifically” standard to section 806 of SOX.172  There, Stacey Platone, the 
manager of labor relations at Atlantic Coast Airlines,173 discovered that 
four union pilots were abusing the flight pay loss system—the system 
whereby the pilot’s union reimbursed the airline for flights that union pilots 
missed, but, under the collective bargaining agreement, were still paid for, 
to attend to union business—by picking up flights on days they knew they 
would be unable to work due to previously scheduled union business.174  In 
March 2003, Ms. Platone revealed this abuse to management.175  By the 
end of the month, she had been terminated, purportedly because of a 
conflict of interest stemming from her undisclosed personal relationship 
with a high-ranking union representative.176
Thereafter, Ms. Platone filed a SOX whistleblower complaint with 
OSHA, alleging that she was terminated because she had discovered “a 
scheme to defraud shareholders and members of the pilot’s union.”
 
177  
After OSHA dismissed the complaint for failure to allege protected activity 
under section 806, Ms. Platone requested a hearing before an ALJ.178  The 
ALJ held that Ms. Platone had alleged protected activity under section 806 
because she reasonably believed that the scheme amounted to fraud against 
the shareholders.179  The airline subsequently appealed the case to the 
ARB.180
The ARB reversed the ALJ’s decision and held that Ms. Platone had not 
engaged in protected activity under section 806.
 
181  The ARB observed that 
“[i]n defining the scope of protected activity under other Federal 
whistleblower protection provisions, the Board has held that an employee’s 
protected communications must relate ‘definitively and specifically’ to the 
subject matter of the particular statute under which protection is 
afforded.”182  To support this view, the ARB cited Kester v. Carolina 
Power & Light Co.,183 where it had held that under the whistleblower 
protection provision of ERA,184
 
 169. Am. Nuclear Res., 134 F.3d at 1295. 
 a whistleblower’s conduct must 
“definitively and specifically” relate to nuclear safety to constitute protected 
 170. Kester v. Carolina Power & Light Co., ARB No. 02-007 (Sept. 30, 2003). 
 171. ARB No. 04-154 (Sept. 29, 2006), aff’d 548 F.3d 222 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 172. See id. at 17. 
 173. Id. at 4. 
 174. Id. at 5–6. 
 175. Id. at 6. 
 176. Id. at 11. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 12. 
 179. Id. at 12–13. 
 180. Id. at 2. 
 181. Id. at 17. 
 182. Id. 
 183. ARB No. 02-007 (Sept. 30, 2003). 
 184. See 42 U.S.C. § 5841(a) (2006). 
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activity.185  Accordingly, the ARB held that to engage in protected activity 
“under . . . SOX, the employee’s communications must ‘definitively and 
specifically’ relate to” one of the rules, regulations, or laws listed in section 
806,186 and dismissed Ms. Platone’s complaint.187
After the ARB’s decision in Platone, a number of federal courts adopted 
the “definitively and specifically” standard to govern the scope of protected 
activity under section 806.
 
188  These federal courts did not adopt this 
standard for the same reasons, however.  One court adopted the 
“definitively and specifically” standard on its own because it “agreed” with 
the ARB’s interpretation;189 another did so because it agreed with other 
courts that adopted the standard.190  Still another accorded Chevron 
deference to the ARB’s “definitively and specifically” standard.191
B.  The “Reasonably Believes” Standard  
 
The “reasonably believes” standard was created by courts to decide 
retaliation claims under Title VII.192  This doctrine was developed after 
courts recognized that if employees were only legally protected from 
retaliation if their employer’s conduct actually violated Title VII—which 
can be difficult, if not impossible, to predict prior to formal adjudication—
few employees would risk filing a Title VII claim.193  Therefore, courts 
developed this standard to provide legal protection to employees who file a 
complaint based on their good faith belief that their employer’s conduct 
violated Title VII.194
 
 185. Kester v. Carolina Power & Light Co., ARB No. 02-007, slip op. at 9 (Sept. 30, 
2003) (holding that under the whistleblower provision of the Energy Reorganization Act, 
protected activity must “definitively and specifically” relate to nuclear safety); see also 42 
U.S.C. § 5841(a). 
 
 186. Platone, ARB No. 04-154, slip op. at 22. 
 187. See id. 
 188. See supra note 14. 
 189. See Allen v. Admin. Review Bd., 514 F.3d 468, 476–77 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that 
the court “agree[s] with the ARB’s legal conclusion that an employee’s complaint must 
‘definitively and specifically relate’ to” one of the rules, regulations, or laws listed in section 
806). 
 190. See Vodopia v. Koninklijke Philips Elecs., N.V., 398 F. App’x 659, 662–63 (2d Cir. 
2010) (“As numerous courts have observed . . . to qualify as protected activity, the 
‘employee’s communications must definitively and specifically relate’” to section 806 
(quoting Van Asdale v. Int’l Game Tech., 577 F.3d 989, 996–97 (9th Cir. 2009)) 
 191. See Welch v. Chao, 536 F.3d 269, 276 n.2 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e afford deference to 
the ARB’s interpretation of § 1514A of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.”). 
 192. See Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a Rights-
Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859, 914 (2008).  This point is emphasized by the 
concurring and dissenting opinion in Sylvester. See Sylvester v. Parexel Int’l, LLC, ARB No. 
07-123, slip op. at 34–35 (May 25, 2011) (Brown, J., concurring and dissenting) (“Under this 
precedent, whistleblower activity that merely ‘implicates’ or ‘touches upon’ the substantive 
statute is protected.”). 
 193. See Brake & Grossman, supra note 192, at 914. 
 194. See id. at 914–15; see also Richard Moberly, The Supreme Court’s Antiretaliation 
Principle, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 375, 451 (2010) (noting that anti-retaliation laws “should 
simply encourage employees to come forward with information that a reasonable person 
with their knowledge and educational experience would believe to be a violation of the law,” 
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In May 2011, the ARB, sitting en banc, held in Sylvester v. Parexel 
International, LLC195 that a whistleblower does not need to report conduct 
that “definitively and specifically” relates to a violation of one of the rules, 
regulations, or laws listed in section 806 to engage in protected activity.196  
Instead, a whistleblower engages in protected activity when she reports 
conduct that she “reasonably believes” violates section 806.197
In Sylvester, two employees of Parexel International, LLC, a publicly 
traded drug testing company,
 
198 filed complaints alleging that they had 
suffered retaliation in violation of section 806.199  The employees had 
different jobs, but both were responsible for reporting accurate clinical data 
and ensuring that Parexel’s clinical testing adhered to the Food and Drug 
Administration’s Good Clinical Practice (GCP) standards.200  In March 
2006, both employees reported to their superiors that they had witnessed 
deviations from the GCP standards.201  Then, in May 2006, one of the 
employees reported to her superior that she had again witnessed a deviation 
from the GCP standards.202  In June 2006, both employees were terminated, 
for what Parexel claimed were personality reasons.203
In the fall of 2006, both employees filed separate complaints with OSHA, 
alleging that they were terminated because they had reported deviations 
from the GCP standards, which they claimed was protected activity under 
section 806.
 
204  OSHA dismissed the complaints.205  Both employees 
appealed, but an ALJ also dismissed their claims on the grounds that they 
failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction because neither had engaged in 
protected activity under section 806.206  The ARB then reversed the ALJ, 
holding that section 806 protects a whistleblower who reports conduct that 
she “reasonably believes” violates one of the rules, regulations, or laws 
listed in section 806.207
 
and that the “reasonable belief” standard has this effect because “the easiest way to 
encourage [employees to come forward] is to protect a broad range of activity.”). 
 
 195. ARB No. 07-123 (en banc). 
 196. Id. at 17–19.  It is worth noting that the Platone ARB was made up of Bush 
Administration appointees, while the Sylvester ARB was made up of judges appointed 
during the Obama Administration. Compare Debra S. Katz & Maura Dundon, Commentary:  
Please Protect Whistleblowers, LEGAL TIMES (Mar. 18, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/
PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202429144387&slreturn=1, with ARB Board Members, U.S. DEPT. 
OF LABOR ADMIN. REV. BD., http://www.dol.gov/arb/members.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 
2012). 
 197. Sylvester, ARB No. 07-123, slip op. at 17–19. 
 198. Id. at 3. 
 199. Id. at 4. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 5–6. 
 204. Id. at 4, 6. 
 205. Id. at 7. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 17–19. 
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In so holding, the ARB also abandoned the “definitively and specifically” 
standard for two reasons.208  First, the definitively and specifically standard 
was “inapposite to the question of what constitutes protected activity under” 
section 806 due to differences between section 806 and the ERA 
whistleblower provision, from which the definitively and specifically 
standard was derived.209  Specifically, the ERA whistleblower protection 
provision contains a “catch-all” provision210 to which the “definitively and 
specifically” standard applies, but section 806 lacks such a provision.211  
Instead, section 806 specifically identifies the rules, regulations, and laws 
that a whistleblower’s communications must relate to in order to be 
protected.212  Second, the text of section 806 only requires that an employee 
“reasonably believe[]” that there has been a violation of a rule, regulation, 
or law listed in section 806,213 and the phrase “definitively and specifically” 
does not appear in section 806’s text.214  Thus, according to the ARB, the 
definitively and specifically standard “presents a potential conflict with the 
express statutory authority of” section 806.215
After explaining why it was abandoning the “definitively and 
specifically” standard, the ARB held that to determine whether a 
whistleblower engaged in protected activity under section 806, “the critical 
focus is on whether the employee reported conduct that he or she 
reasonably believes constituted a violation of federal law.”
   
216  Therefore, 
the issue in this case was whether the employees, “provided information to 
Parexel that they reasonably believed related to one of the violations listed 
in section 806, and not whether that information ‘definitively and 
specifically’ described one or more of those violations.”217  Accordingly, 
the ARB held that the complaints should not have been dismissed.218
The ARB also explained what a whistleblower must do to engage in 
protected activity under the “reasonably believes” standard.
 
219  It noted that 
it has consistently interpreted the concept of “‘reasonable belief’ to require 
a complainant to have a subjective belief that the complained-of conduct 
constitutes a violation of relevant law, and also that the belief is objectively 
reasonable.”220
 
 208. Id. 
  To satisfy the subjective prong of this test, the employee 
must have “actually believed” that what she complained of constituted a 
 209. Id. at 18; see supra notes 166–74 and accompanying text. 
 210. See 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a)(1)(F) (2006) (prohibiting employers from discriminating 
against employees who participate or assist in any proceeding or action related to a violation 
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954).  
 211. Sylvester, ARB No. 07-123, slip op. at 17. 
 212. Id.; see also supra note 51. 
 213. Sylvester, ARB No. 07-123, slip op. at 17. 
 214. See id. at 17–18. This point is explained at greater length by the concurring opinion. 
See id. at 24–27 (Corchado, J., concurring). 
 215. Id. at 18 (majority opinion). 
 216. Id. at 19. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id.  
 219. Id. at 14–15. 
 220. Id. 
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violation of the relevant law.221  To satisfy the objective prong, the plaintiff 
must show that a reasonable employee “in the same factual circumstances 
with the same training and experience” would also have thought that the 
complained-of conduct violated the relevant law.222  Importantly, however, 
the ARB explained that section 806 protects a whistleblower even if, after 
further investigation, there was no violation.223
III.  WHY THE “REASONABLY BELIEVES” STANDARD SHOULD GOVERN 
THE SCOPE OF PROTECTED ACTIVITY UNDER SECTION 806 OF SOX 
 
The ARB’s decision to adopt the “reasonably believes” standard should 
be entitled to Chevron deference, despite the ARB’s evolving position and 
the existence of contrary precedent in some jurisdictions.224  Empirical 
studies of the Supreme Court’s decisions, however, demonstrate that when 
Chevron should apply, courts225 are nearly as likely to engage in ad hoc 
statutory interpretation as they are to defer to the agency’s decision.226
In such a circumstance, this part argues that the “reasonably believes” 
should still govern the scope of protected activity under Section 806 for 
several reasons.  First, the “definitively and specifically” standard is 
inconsistent with the text of section 806.  Second, the legislative history 
supports the “reasonably believes” standard.  Third, the “reasonably 
believes” standard is more consistent with the reasonable person standard 
that Congress intended.  Fourth, the Dodd-Frank Act did not constitute 
congressional endorsement of, or acquiescence to, the “definitively and 
specifically” standard.  Finally, the “reasonably believes” standard 
effectuates important public policy goals because it will help reverse the 
lack of success whistleblowers have had litigating section 806 claims, and it 
will harmonize the protected activity standards under SOX and the Dodd-
Frank Act. 
   
Therefore, it is foreseeable that a court asked to review an ARB decision in 
a SOX whistleblower case will neglect Chevron and engage in ad hoc 
statutory interpretation.   
A.  An Obvious and Fatal Flaw:  The “Definitively and Specifically” 
Standard Conflicts with the Text of Section 806 
Any analysis of whether the “definitively and specifically” standard or 
the “reasonably believes” standard should govern the scope of protected 
 
 221. Id. at 14.  When determining what an employee “actually believed,” the ARB takes 
the employee’s education and sophistication under consideration. Id. at 14–15. 
 222. Id. at 15. 
 223. Id. at 16; see also Welch v. Chao, 536 F.3d 269, 277 (4th Cir. 2008); Allen v. 
Admin. Review Bd., 514 F.3d 468, 477 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Importantly, an employee’s 
reasonable but mistaken belief that an employer engaged in conduct that constitutes a 
violation of one of the six enumerated categories is protected.” (citation omitted)). 
 224. See supra Part I.D.1. 
 225. Although the empirical evidence in this Note only discusses Supreme Court 
decisions, it is fair to assume that this evidence is also instructive regarding lower federal 
courts. See supra note 18. 
 226. See supra notes 157, 164 and accompanying text.  
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activity under section 806 based on traditional statutory interpretation 
principles must begin, as the Supreme Court instructs, with the text of the 
statute.227  Beginning with the text is also strongly encouraged by recent 
empirical studies of the Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation 
jurisprudence that have identified the text of a statute as one of the most 
frequently cited tools of statutory interpretation.228
Unfortunately for the definitively and specifically standard, the text of 
section 806 clearly supports the reasonably believes standard for two 
reasons.  First, the text of section 806 includes the phrase “reasonably 
believes,” while “definitively and specifically” does not appear in the 
text.
   
229  This first strike against the definitively and specifically standard is 
as obvious as it is devastating because the Supreme Court has held that it 
will “ordinarily resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not 
appear on its face.”230  Second, the definitively and specifically standard 
would add limiting language to the statutory text of section 806, which the 
Supreme Court has refused to do in two recent decisions.231
Nevertheless, it is possible to justify reading the definitively and 
specifically standard into the text of section 806 if the ordinary meaning of 
the statute’s language
 
232 or the statutory context support its inclusion.233  
One potential contextual argument in support of the definitively and 
specifically standard is that the criminal whistleblower protection in SOX 
applies to “any Federal offense,”234 while section 806 was limited to 
particular rules, regulations, and laws.235
Additionally, the ordinary meaning of the phrase “reasonably believes” 
does not support reading “definitively and specifically” into the text of 
section 806.  The Oxford English Dictionary defines “reasonably” as “with 
good reason, justly, properly” and “suitably, sufficiently, fairly.”
  Arguably, therefore, the 
definitively and specifically standard gives effect to Congress’s decision to 
use limiting language in section 806 because this standard requires 
whistleblowers to engage in more specific conduct.  However, the 
definitively and specifically standard is not needed to give effect to this 
distinction.  To engage in protected activity under the reasonably believes 
standard, whistleblowers still must report conduct that relates to a violation 
of one of the rules, regulations, or laws listed in section 806.  Accordingly, 
the reasonably believes standard also effectuates Congress’s decision to 
limit the application of section 806 to particular rules, regulations, and laws. 
236
 
 227. See supra note 86. 
  It 
 228. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 229. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 230. Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29 (1997); see supra note 90 and accompanying 
text. 
 231. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 232. See supra note 88. 
 233. See supra note 87. 
 234. See supra note 9. 
 235. See supra note 51. 
 236. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 291 (2d ed. 1989). 
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defines “believe” as “to believe in a thing, e.g. the truth of a statement.”237
To summarize, the text of section 806 lends strong support to the 
reasonably believes standard.  Further, neither the ordinary meaning of 
section 806’s language nor the statutory context support reading the 
definitively and specifically standard into the text of section 806.  Thus, the 
statutory interpretation inquiry should end.  The Supreme Court has stated 
“time and again” that its “analysis begins with ‘the language of the statute.’  
And when the statutory language provides a clear answer, it ends there as 
well.”
  
Putting these definitions together, the ordinary meaning of “reasonably 
believes” is a just, proper, or fair belief that something is true.  Thus, 
section 806’s text demands that whistleblowers have a just, proper, and fair 
belief that some conduct violates one of the rules, regulations, or laws listed 
in section 806, yet the definitively and specifically standard demands much 
more.  Indeed, the ordinary meaning of the phrase “reasonably believes” 
has to do with what the whistleblower thought about the conduct, while the 
definitively and specifically standard relates to the type of conduct the 
whistleblower reported.  Accordingly, the ordinary meaning of the phrase 
“reasonably believes” also does not support reading the definitively and 
specifically standard into the text of section 806. 
238  However, the Court has recently begun to examine the legislative 
history of a statute to confirm its plain meaning, even when the statutory 
language is clear,239 despite Justice Scalia’s vociferous protest.240
B.  The Legislative History Supports the “Reasonably Believes” Standard 
  
Accordingly, although it appears that the statutory language demonstrates 
that the reasonably believes standard should govern the scope of protected 
activity under section 806, this Note nevertheless analyzes section 806’s 
legislative history as well. 
The Supreme Court does not treat all forms of legislative history 
equally.241  Instead, the Supreme Court has typically considered committee 
reports to be the most important, followed by statements made by the 
drafters of the legislation in question, language rejected by Congress, and, 
to a far lesser extent, statements by non-drafters, congressional silence, and 
subsequent congressional action or inaction.242
There are no grounds for considering changes in the statutory language 
because section 806 was enacted in the same form that it was initially 
proposed.
 
243
 
 237. Id. at 87. 
  However, a significant amount of interpretive information can 
be drawn from section 806’s legislative history.  Most notably, the 
 238. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999) (quoting Estate of 
Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475 (1992)); see supra note 91 and 
accompanying text. 
 239. See supra note 93. 
 240. See supra note 94. 
 241. See supra notes 98–103 and accompanying text. 
 242. See supra notes 98–103 and accompanying text. 
 243. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
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Committee Report and the statements of Senator Patrick Leahy, one of 
section 806’s principal drafters,244 discuss several key purposes for this 
provision of SOX:  providing whistleblowers with protection from 
retaliation under federal law,245 changing the corporate culture that 
discriminates and retaliates against whistleblowers,246 and encouraging 
more corporate whistleblowers to come forward to aid complex corporate 
fraud investigations.247
There is no doubt that section 806 provides whistleblowers with 
protection from retaliation under federal law.
  Accordingly, to determine whether the legislative 
history supports the “definitively and specifically” standard or the 
“reasonably believes” standard, this Note analyzes which standard is more 
consistent with providing whistleblowers with protection from retaliation 
under federal law, changing the corporate culture that discriminates and 
retaliates against whistleblowers, and encouraging more whistleblowers to 
come forward and aid corporate fraud investigations. 
248
On the other hand, only the reasonably believes standard properly 
effectuates Congress’s goal of changing the corporate culture that silences 
whistleblowers by discriminating and retaliating against them.  Congress 
specifically noted its concern that employers’ outside counsel often 
determine the precise boundaries of state law whistleblower protection.
  Although the “definitively 
and specifically” standard and the “reasonably believes” standard affect the 
breadth of this protection, both standards maintain the protection from 
retaliation that section 806 created.  Accordingly, both standards will ensure 
that whistleblowers are protected from retaliation under federal law, and 
this issue is moot in determining which standard the legislative history 
supports. 
249  
This, in turn, feeds the corporate culture that discriminates and retaliates 
against whistleblowers because employers are often well aware of what 
types of retaliatory conduct they can engage in without violating the law.  
The definitively and specifically standard leaves too much room for 
employers to discriminate and retaliate against whistleblowers without 
violating the law.  Indeed, in Platone, the whistleblower had a reasonable 
belief that the conduct she reported violated section 806, according to the 
ALJ,250 but the ARB held that this was not enough to be protected under 
the definitively and specifically standard.251
 
 244. See supra note 
  Thus, in that case, an 
employer was permitted to retaliate against an employee who was 
attempting to blow the whistle on conduct that she reasonably believed was 
improper.  Therefore, only the “reasonably believes” standard furthers 
Congress’s goal of changing the corporate culture that discriminates and 
retaliates against whistleblowers. 
56. 
 245. See supra notes 60–66 and accompanying text. 
 246. See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text. 
 247. See supra note 59. 
 248. See supra note 51; see also, e.g., Moberly, supra note 105, at 67. 
 249. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 250. See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
 251. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
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The reasonably believes standard is also more consistent with Congress’s 
goal of encouraging whistleblowers to come forward and aid corporate 
fraud investigations.  One could argue that the reasonably believes standard 
is inconsistent with this goal because it does not require whistleblowers to 
provide enough information to root out illegal conduct.  However, Congress 
explained that section 806 was intended to impose the normal reasonable 
person standard,252 and, under this standard, an employee remains protected 
from retaliation even if the alleged illegal conduct did not violate the 
law.253  By clearly invoking a standard that protects employees even if the 
alleged illegal conduct turns out to be legal, Congress decided that the best 
way to aid corporate fraud investigations was to ensure that all complaints, 
even potentially inaccurate ones, are brought to the attention of law 
enforcement authorities.  Accordingly, it cannot be said that Congress’s 
intent was only to protect whistleblowers who report information specific 
enough to root out illegal conduct.  Further, the easiest way to encourage 
more whistleblowers to come forward is to protect a broad range of 
activity,254 which can be achieved by adopting the reasonably believes 
standard.255
In all, although either standard would provide whistleblowers with 
protection against retaliation under federal law, only the “reasonably 
believes” standard is consistent with Congress’s goal of changing the 
corporate culture that discriminates and retaliates against whistleblowers 
and encouraging more whistleblowers to come forward to aid corporate 
fraud investigations. 
   
C.  The “Reasonably Believes” Standard Is More Consistent 
with the Reasonable Person Standard that Congress Intended 
Congress “intended to impose the normal reasonable person standard 
used and interpreted in a wide variety of legal contexts” through section 
806.256  This reasonable person standard, according to the ARB, only 
requires that a whistleblower’s communications “touch upon” or 
“implicate” the statute in question.257  Also, Congress intended section 
806’s whistleblower protections to be similar to the protections provided 
under the WPA,258 which only requires that a whistleblower report conduct 
that she “reasonably believes” constitutes government fraud or waste to 
engage in protected activity.259
The “reasonably believes” standard is more consistent with what 
Congress intended.  It only requires that a whistleblower actually believe 
that there has been a violation of section 806 and that a reasonable person in 
 
 
 252. See supra note 72. 
 253. See supra note 223 and accompanying text. 
 254. See supra note 194. 
 255. See supra note 194. 
 256. S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 19 (2002); see also supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 257. See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
 258. See supra note 78. 
 259. See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text. 
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her position would have the same opinion.260
D.  The Dodd-Frank Act Did Not Constitute Congressional Endorsement of 
or Acquiescence to the “Definitively and Specifically” Standard 
  Thus, a whistleblower’s 
alleged protected activity could merely “touch upon” or “implicate” a 
violation of the rules, regulations, or laws listed in section 806, which is the 
standard that Congress intended, and satisfy the reasonably believes 
standard.  On the other hand, by its own terms, the “definitively and 
specifically” standard demands more than merely touching upon or 
implicating section 806.  Further, it is its own distinct legal standard apart 
from the normal reasonable person standard.  Accordingly, the reasonably 
believes standard is more consistent with the reasonable person standard 
that Congress intended. 
The Supreme Court has stated that congressional inaction is “perhaps the 
weakest of all tools for ascertaining legislative intent,” and that courts 
should be “loath” to presume that inaction amounts to congressional 
endorsement unless “the issue plainly has been the subject of congressional 
attention.”261  Here, the Dodd-Frank Act amendments to section 806 were 
enacted with little congressional attention.262
E.  Public Policy Perspective 
  Accordingly, the Dodd-Frank 
Act cannot be interpreted as congressional endorsement of or acquiescence 
to the definitively and specifically standard. 
In addition to being more consistent with the text and legislative history 
of section 806, the “reasonably believes” standard also effectuates two 
important public policy goals.  First, it will help more whistleblowers take 
advantage of section 806’s anti-retaliation protections, and, second, it will 
harmonize the protected activity standards under SOX and the Dodd-Frank 
Act.  Congress enacted section 806 in part because it believed that 
protecting corporate whistleblowers was in the public interest due to 
whistleblowers’ critical role in uncovering and reporting corporate fraud.263  
However, whistleblowers have had very little success using section 806’s 
anti-retaliation protections.264  This lack of success is partly due to a narrow 
interpretation of the scope of protected activity.265  The reasonably believes 
standard will significantly broaden the scope of protected activity,266
 
 260. See supra notes 
 and, 
therefore, will help whistleblowers make use of the anti-retaliation 
provisions under section 806, which Congress believed served an important 
219–28 and accompanying text. 
 261. Supra note 104 and accompanying text.  The Supreme Court also seems particularly 
disenchanted with congressional acquiescence to, or endorsement of, administrative 
interpretations of statutes. See supra note 104. 
 262. See supra note 120. 
 263. See supra note 59. 
 264. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 265. See supra notes 107, 117 and accompanying text. 
 266. See supra note 194. 
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public interest.267  Additionally, while the “reasonably believes” standard 
will not entirely bridge the gap between SOX and the Dodd-Frank Act, it 
will help by harmonizing the protected activity standards under the two 
statutes.268  This should allay some of the fear269
CONCLUSION 
 that the Dodd-Frank Act 
has created a two-tiered whistleblower protection scheme. 
Whistleblowers play a critical role in detecting and reporting corporate 
fraud.270  Therefore, protecting them from retaliation is an important public 
policy goal.271  However, despite Congress’s attempt to protect 
whistleblowers from retaliation under federal law through section 806 of 
SOX, whistleblowers have had little success using this new legal 
protection.272  One of the major impediments to section 806’s effectiveness 
is the “definitively and specifically” standard, which is a narrow 
construction of the scope of protected activity under section 806.273
In recognition of the overwhelming evidence that the “reasonably 
believes” standard is the proper interpretation of the scope of protected 
activity under section 806, federal courts that neglect Chevron and review 
the ARB’s SOX decisions through their own ad hoc statutory interpretation 
should adopt the reasonably believes standard.  This change would bring 
the scope of protected activity under section 806 in line with its text and 
legislative history, as well as important public policy goals. 
 
 
 267. See supra note 59. 
 268. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (discussing the final SEC rules 
implementing the Dodd-Frank Act, which adopted the “reasonably believes” standard to 
govern the scope of protected activity). 
 269. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
 270. See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text. 
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